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For nearly half a century (cf. Hendrik S. 
Houthakker and Stephen P. Magee 1969), econ-
omists have known that trade flows were two to 
three times more volatile than GDP despite the 
fact that standard theories predicted an elasticity 
of one. A major puzzle developed in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 as standard econometric mod-
els, which already incorporated these very high 
elasticities, could only predict 70 to 80 percent 
of the decline in world trade (see the estimates 
in Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) 2009).
Over the next two years, economists have tried, 
with little success, to improve on this “70 per-
cent solution.” Much progress has been made in 
building theoretical models to explain why trade 
elasticities might differ from one, and calibration 
exercises soon began to match the econometric 
evidence. For example, Rudolfs Bems, Robert C. 
Johnson, and Kei-Mu Yi (2010) argue that once 
one takes into account input-output linkages, 
one can replicate the elasticity of imports with 
respect to GDP of three and explain 70 percent 
of the decline in world trade. Similarly, Jonathan 
Eaton et al. (2011) obtained an 80-percent solu-
tion using a more elaborate general equilibrium 
model. As a result of this, many economists have 
been arguing that one needs to consider trade 
finance-based explanations for why calibration 
exercises to date have underestimated the decline 
in world trade.
This paper reviews some of the evidence that 
financial factors may have resulted in a greater 
decline in exports than were predicted in models 
without financial frictions. We provide two new 
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pieces of evidence that support the trade finance 
channel. First, we show that export prices rose 
relative to domestic manufacturing prices across 
a large number of countries. Second, we find 
that import and export prices of goods shipped 
by sea, which are likely to be affected most by 
trade finance contractions, rose disproportion-
ately more than those shipped by air or land.
I. What is Trade Finance and Why Does it Matter 
For Exports?
At the most basic level, trade finance con-
sists of borrowing using trade credit (accounts 
receivable) as collateral and/or the purchase of 
insurance against the possibility of trade credit 
defaults. In traditional trade finance contracts, 
exporters obtain working capital loans, credit 
lines, discounted prepayments, or credit default 
insurance based on foreign purchase orders or 
credit guarantees provided by the importer’s 
bank. Exporters tend to be much heavier users 
of trade finance than domestic firms because 
international transactions tend to take much lon-
ger to execute than domestic transactions and 
because of the perceived higher risk of interna-
tional transactions. As Mary Amiti and David E. 
Weinstein (2009) have argued, the higher sen-
sitivity of exports to financial forces provides a 
reason why exports should be more susceptible 
to financial shocks than domestic sales. JaeBin 
Ahn (2010) expanded on this intuition by devel-
oping the first general equilibrium framework 
for understanding why trade is particularly sen-
sitive to financial shocks.
There are several reasons why these normally 
quiet markets may have provided an important 
conduit through which financial shocks affected 
trade flows in the recent crisis. First, Lehman’s 
default caused interbank lending markets to 
seize up. As one can see in Figure 1, the Lehman 
bankruptcy caused the London Interbank 
Offered Rate–Overnight Swap (LIBOR-OS) 
rate to rise sharply in most countries. This dra-
matic rise in interbank borrowing rates is strong 
 evidence in favor of the idea that banks were 
facing  difficulties raising short-term funds. The 
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higher borrowing costs were naturally passed 
through to trade finance contracts since these 
contracts are typically indexed to interbank 
rates. However, the impact of the financial crisis 
on the trade finance market was even larger. Six 
of Lehman’s 30 largest unsecured creditors were 
institutions providing letters of credit (Amiti and 
Weinstein 2009). Moreover, the troubles of AIG 
and Citigroup meant that financial counterpar-
ties became much more concerned about AIG’s 
credit default insurance and Citibank’s credit 
guarantees. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) report 
the results of an International Monetary Fund–
Bankers’ Association for Trade and Finance (IMF-BAFT) survey of 88 banks in 44 countries 
that revealed that the average spreads on trade-
related lending rose by 70 to 107 basis points 
during the crisis. These increases are remarkable 
given that typical spreads are around one fifth as 
large. By April 2009, the G20 countries pledged 
250 billion dollars in trade finance in an effort to 
alleviate the difficulties faced by exporters.
Amiti and Weinstein (2009) show that a dete-
rioration in the health of Japanese banks in the 
current crisis caused their client firms’ exports 
to fall by more than their domestic sales even 
after controlling for industry-time fixed effects. 
Other papers that have used external finance 
dependence measures at the industry level as 
measures have, for the most part, also found 
that exports declined the most in industries with 
high external finance dependence. Jean-Charles 
Bricongne et al. (2010) and Davin Chor and 
Kalina Manova (2010) argue that sectors that 
were more financially dependent cut back on 
exports more. By contrast, Andrei Levchenko, 
Logan Lewis, and Linda Tesar (2010b) failed 
to find a relationship between external finance 
dependence and US imports. However, Mona 
Haddad, Ann Harrison, and Catherine Hausman (2010) provide a simple explanation for this 
finding. The reason why import values did not 
fall more in financially dependent sectors in the 
United States is that import prices in sectors with 
high levels of external finance dependence rose 
by much more than the prices in other sectors. 
These higher import prices offset the declines in 
quantities and propped up import values, mak-
ing it appear that there was no external finance 
effect on import values.
Although measures of external finance depen-
dence are attractive to empirical researchers 
because they provide a way of linking aggregate 
data to financial conditions, there are serious 
issues with most of the aggregate measures of 
trade finance. The first is that the conventional 
measure of external finance dependence is com-
pletely uncorrelated with levels of trade finance. 
To see this, consider the definition of external 
finance dependence used in the literature: the 
share of capital expenditures that cannot be 
financed by cash flow. The definition of cash 
flow can be written as: (Cash Receipts − Cash 
Payments) − (Change in Inventories) − (Change 
in Receivables) + (Change in Payables). Firms 
with high trade finance needs are those with high 
levels of receivables and firms with low trade 
finance needs will have low levels of receiv-
ables, but if these needs remain unchanged, firms 
with high and low trade finance needs will have 
identical measures of external finance depen-
dence. This does not mean that external finance 
dependence does not matter, but it does mean, 
as Robert C. Feenstra, Zhiyuan Li, and Miaojie 
Yu (2010) note, that the trade finance channel is 
a different channel than that of the conventional 
external finance channel.
A second issue in the literature surrounds the 
usage of trade credit intensity as a measure of 
trade finance intensity. For example, Levchenko, 
Lewis, and Tesar (2010b) assess trade finance 
dependence by looking at whether industries 
with high levels of accounts receivable relative 
to sales were hit harder. A problem with this 
measure is that trade finance has ambiguous 
effects on this ratio—more trade finance enables 
companies to finance their accounts receivable, 
but many trade finance products like letters of 
credit and export factoring enable exporters to 
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remove trade credits from their balance sheets in 
exchange for discounted prepayments.
Indeed, the impact of credit problems affect-
ing these export factors is likely to be extremely 
hard to discern using only aggregate data on 
interbank rates and sectoral finance dependence. 
CIT, for instance, was a major export factor in 
2008 with $80 billion of assets that received 
$2.3 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds. At the time of its bankruptcy in 
2009, CIT had over a million customers in over 
50 countries spread across 30 industries.1 As this 
example illustrates, it is probably quite difficult 
to capture the effects of massive trade finance–
related insolvencies without matched exporter–
financial institution data.
II. Do Price Movements Indicate an Export 
Supply Shock?
Despite the substantial data problems associ-
ated with identification, one can conjecture that 
if trade finance mattered in macro data, it would 
appear as a form of supply shock to exporters. 
The problem of discerning trade finance shocks 
from the data is that exporters were also buf-
feted by a series of demand shocks. However, 
some studies have provided evidence that sup-
ply shocks were particularly important for 
exporters. For example, Levchenko, Lewis, and 
Tesar (2010a) find that automobile imports—
which fell quite rapidly in the crisis—actually 
experienced a rise in import prices. This seems 
to contradict the notion suggested by George 
Alessandria, Joe Kaboski, and Virgiliu Midrigan (2010) that the key driver of the decline in auto-
mobile sales was demand. Similarly, Haddad, 
Harrison, and Hausman (2010) decompose the 
declines in imports in the United States and 
European Union and find that import prices of 
manufactures actually rose in these countries: a 
fact that is more consistent with relatively large 
falls in imports arising from relatively large sup-
ply contractions.
We can also see these forces in operation by 
looking at aggregate price evidence. Overall, the 
prices of manufacturing goods fell sharply in the 
European Union, Japan, and the United States, 
so there is no question that the global economy 
1 http://ir.cit.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=99314&p=irol-news 
Article&ID=1170834&highlight= 
was hit by a massive demand shock. This is the 
basis of the 70 percent solution. However, there 
is also some evidence of supply shocks differen-
tially affecting exporters. We can examine this 
more generally by looking at what happened 
to export prices relative to domestic producer 
prices. Our approach is to construct measures 
of the log change in export prices less the log 
change in producer prices for a series of OECD 
countries.
Figure 2 shows the plot for the United States, 
European Union and Japan. As one can see from 
the graph, US nonagricultural export prices 
staged their highest relative price increase in the 
first several quarters after the Lehman bankruptcy 
that they had experienced in the last ten years. 
And this happened in spite of the fact that the 
trade weighted dollar appreciated over this time 
period. Similarly, European exporters raised their 
prices relative to domestic manufacturers. Most 
surprisingly, Japan, which suffered a 20 percent 
decline in its export to GDP ratio in the first 
quarter of 2009—the largest quarterly decline in 
exports of any OECD country during the crisis—
also saw its export prices rise sharply relative 
to its producer prices. The fact that exporters in 
the United States, European Union, and Japan—
which jointly accounted for 51 percent of world 
exports in 2009—raised their relative export 
Figure 2. Log Change in Export Prices less Log Change 
in Manufacturing Prices
Notes: US export data are the nonagricultural export prices, 
and the manufacturing data are the Producer Price Index 
for industrial commodities. EU export data are the EU-27 
Producer Price Index for manufactured exports, and the 
manufacturing data are the domestic Producer Price Index 
for manufactured goods. Japanese export data are export 
prices, and the manufacturing data are the domestic corpo-
rate manufacturing goods price index.
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prices  suggests that exports may have been facing 
a larger supply shock than domestic sales.
Amiti and Weinstein (2009) argue that the 
greater shipping times mean that trade  financing 
needs are likely to be more important for goods 
shipped by sea than those shipped by air because 
exporters shipping by sea need more short-term 
working capital financing and face greater pay-
ment default risk while their goods are in tran-
sit. For the United States, goods shipped by land 
from Canada and Mexico also have quite short 
shipping times. Therefore, we examine whether 
goods shipped by sea, which were likely to be 
more susceptible to trade finance shocks, experi-
enced greater price increases than goods shipped 
by air or land.
We use monthly US bilateral export and 
import data at the HS-10 level by mode of 
transport from the US Census Bureau for the 
period from January 2007 through July 2010 
for all manufactured goods. One problem with 
these data is that the quantity information at 
the HS-10 level by country is not produced by 
mode of transport. Fortunately, at this level of 
aggregation most goods exported to or imported 
from a country are moved predominantly using 
a single mode of transport. We therefore catego-
rized shipments as “seaborne” if more than 90 
percent of the value of the goods exported to or 
imported from a country in a particular month 
were done by sea. Similarly, we classified goods 
as “not seaborne” if more than 90 percent of the 
shipments were not done by sea. We were able 
to classify 84 percent of imports and exports in 
this manner as either seaborne or not seaborne 
and construct unit values accordingly.
Our basic regression specification is pre-
sented below:
 ln  p hct =  α ht +  α ct +  β 1 × sE A hct 
 +  β 2 × sE A hct × cRisi s t +  ϵ hct ,
where phct is the unit value of HS code h exported 
to or imported from country c in month t, sEAhct 
is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
shipment was made by sea, and cRisist is an 
indicator variable if the shipment occurred dur-
ing the financial crisis, and all Greek variables 
are parameters to be estimated. Our specification 
includes a full set of HS-time and country-time 
dummies which should eliminate any good-spe-
cific or country specific demand shock such as 
macro or exchange rate shocks. Based on Figure 
1, we use two definitions for the crisis period. 
First, we define it from the point of the Lehman 











Crisis = 1 if
9/08 to 6/09
Crisis = 1 if
9/08 to 9/09
Crisis = 1 if
9/08 to 6/09
Crisis = 1 if
9/08 to 9/09
Sea = 1 if value share shipped −0.512*** −0.513*** −0.890*** −0.892***
 by sea > 90 percent (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Sea × crisis 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Fixed effects:
 HS10-time Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Country-time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,897,503 2,897,503 2,675,669 2,675,669
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.82
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis with 200 repetitions. We define the export price as the ratio of the value of 
exports to the quantity shipped from the United States to country c at time t, and the import price as the ratio of the value of 
imports to the quantity shipped into the United States from country c at time t. We clean the data by dropping the top and bot-
tom 12.5 percentiles based on the 12 month changes in log unit value. We drop any HS 10-digit code if the unit of measurement 
changed. In order to reduce the number of fixed effects and make the estimation easier, we dropped any country that made up 
less than 0.1 of a percent in total imports or exports. This leaves us with 57 countries that export to the United States and 71 
countries that import from the United States.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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bankruptcy (i.e., September 2008) until the point 
it fell below 50 basis points (June 2009). Second 
we define it from the point of the Lehman bank-
ruptcy until it returned to its long-run value of 
around 10 basis points (September 2009).
The results from this estimation exercise are 
presented in Table 1. The coefficient on the 
sea dummy is negative, indicating that goods 
shipped by sea tend to be substantially cheaper 
than goods shipped by air. What is most interest-
ing from our perspective is that goods exported 
by sea tended to see their FOB prices rise by 
about 3 percent relative to goods shipped by air 
or land during the crisis period. Similarly, US 
seaborne imports saw their prices rise by 2 per-
cent relative to goods delivered by land and sea 
during the crisis period. In other words, we see 
that the prices of goods that are likely to be the 
most sensitive to trade finance shocks were the 
ones that experienced the greatest relative price 
increases. While this evidence is not as direct as 
the firm-level evidence in Amiti and Weinstein (2009), it is suggestive of the idea that supply 
shocks in trade finance–intensive transactions 
contributed to the decline in world trade during 
the crisis.
III. Conclusion
While there is no question that demand 
played a major part in the decline in world trade, 
there is increasing evidence that the liquidity 
contractions that rocked the financial world also 
played a part. Firm level evidence indicates that 
exporters whose financial institutions became 
unhealthy cut back on exports more than other 
firms, and imports declined more in sectors that 
had greater external financial dependence. This 
paper shows that some of these shocks may 
also have appeared in price movements. Export 
prices rose relative to domestic manufacturing 
prices during the crisis, and the prices of sea-
borne imports and exports—which are more 
sensitive to financial shocks—rose relative to 
goods sent by land or air. These are all indicative 
of important supply side shocks that may help us 
move beyond the 70 percent solution.
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